Over the last two months, liquidity in the banking sector has been drying up. It was a liquidity crunch that caused the crash in 2008, and the government was forced to bail out the banks to the tune of $66 billion to keep Russia’s financial sector afloat.
Happily, the Kremlin was successful, and the banking sector did survive (unlike
in 1998). Hats off to the now-ousted Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, thanks to
whom Russia
had about $600 billion in reserves.
Now liquidity is drying up again. If liquidity goes negative, bankers will
start worrying about who is going to go bust, and that will mean lending
between banks will freeze.
So, are we headed for the abyss? Certainly Russia is in a dangerous place, as
confidence is clearly fading fast. It looks increasingly likely that the E.U.
is going to try to ring-fence Greece
and then let it default — the jolt this would provide to confidence could send Russia
over the edge.
But if the shock does come, Russia
is better prepared than it was in 2008. Knowing a shock is coming is winning
half the battle, as one of the reasons that the economy froze in 2008 and hit
Russia so much harder than Western economies was that the 1998 devaluation was
fresh in everyone’s mind. So they simply stopped doing business until it was
clear how the crunch was going to play out; the fact that Russia’s economy has
bounced back so fast will go a long way to muting the impact of this round of
crisis — if it comes.
Secondly, Russia
is in a much stronger economic position than it was going into 2008. Most of
the damage was done by the borrowing binge that preceded the 2008 collapse.
Russian banks and companies had tapped international capital markets during the
boom years. Worse, many companies had used their shares as collateral, which
led to so-called “margin calls” during the very worst of the crisis. This time
round there will be few, if any, margin calls, as the 2008 crisis squeezed all
these deals out of the market.
Stepping back a bit further, big companies have been starting to borrow again,
but a second lesson from the crisis has been that the debt profile of Russian
companies and banks is much better than two years ago: Companies have
lengthened the maturities of their loans to medium-term debt while swapping a
lot of their foreign borrowing for ruble loans. As the Russian government has
plenty of cash and the banks are dominated by the state, the government is in a
stronger position to restructure debt if a company gets into trouble, as it can
all be done “in house.”
But everything will depend on how well the E.U. manages the Greek problem.
Surely, opting for a controlled Greek default is an extremely risky strategy
and one that the less robust and more nervous emerging markets such as Russia will not
welcome. Banks are built on trust, and defaults are by definition a betrayal of
that trust. A controlled devaluation is a logistical exercise, but the trouble
is that if it is badly managed then fear could get ahead of the control
mechanisms; if this fear is large enough, even healthy banks can go bust. There
is plenty of room for surprises, and these could easily lead to a meltdown.
Originally published at the Moscow Times.
All rights reserved by Rossiyskaya Gazeta.
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